1. Panamera, Starting at 998,000 RMB
Zhou Ming’s reason for buying a Porsche Panamera was bluntly simple: it looks stunning. With its sleek fastback silhouette, wide stance, and striking frog-eye headlamps, the Panamera blends the athleticism of a sports car with the sophistication of an executive sedan. When the first-generation Panamera debuted, it went viral almost overnight for its sheer beauty, becoming the dream car of countless enthusiasts—the kind that turns heads on every street.
"I bought it purely for the looks," says Zhou, a devoted Panamera design fan. But he also has high standards for driving dynamics, especially power delivery. For him, performance is the top priority when choosing a car, and sporty luxury models are always his first choice. On his wish list also sits the Mercedes‑Benz CLE 53 Cabriolet; his previous car was a BMW X4M, a high‑performance midsize coupe‑SUV. Although the Panamera is a D‑segment luxury sedan over five meters long, its chassis, drivetrain, and steering all follow sports‑car development logic—every detail appeals to Zhou.
His second reason might sound a bit like showing off: it was cheap—at least unexpectedly so. Since the second half of 2025, Zhou, who had been following the Panamera closely, noticed on social media that discounts on his dream car were suddenly deepening. Based on market prices at the time, he judged that the window was perfect. He decided to ride the wave of price cuts. Last November, he took delivery of a base Panamera at an on‑road price just over 1 million RMB. He was both surprised and delighted when paying: "This car used to sell for 1.3 million, and you even had to pay a premium to get it. Now, with options included, the final price dropped by 300,000 RMB—and I didn't even have to pay the luxury car tax."
Yet, to his surprise, within half a year of taking delivery, the Panamera had fallen below the million‑yuan mark. In March 2026, Porsche launched the Panamera Era Edition in China, with a starting price of 998,000 RMB—the first time in the model's history that the official base price has dipped under one million yuan.
From a consumer psychology perspective, the difference between 1,000,000 and 990,000 RMB is not just 10,000 yuan—it marks a boundary between two social tiers. A Panamera priced at 1 million still belongs to the "million‑yuan luxury car" club, carrying a status badge and serving as the lowest threshold into the wealthy class. Once it drops below one million, that psychological barrier collapses. It shifts from an exclusive dream ride for the rich to something within reach of corporate executives and high‑income professionals—and in doing so, its halo inevitably dims.
Cheng Ye, who works in finance, understands that cars are consumables and that price cuts reflect market forces. But as an owner of the previous‑generation Panamera, seeing the new model priced under 1 million still gave him a slight feeling of being "stabbed in the back." "Some people buy luxury cars precisely for the status they confer," says Cheng, who places great value on brand equity. The shield‑shaped crest on the hood is itself a symbol of identity; if the price drops, he believes, its value as a social signal will inevitably suffer.
Still, Cheng has made peace with it, telling himself, "Buy early, enjoy early." "The demystification is real, but I've never regretted buying it." With the entire market trending downward, he adds, "If Porsche can hold its ground in this environment, I'll actually respect it more."
2. 13 Options Now Standard
How did a Panamera—often priced at one to two million yuan, with the Turbo S Executive stretching to nearly four million—fall below one million? The answer lies on Porsche's official website. On each model page, one of the most prominent features is the configurator, a cornerstone of Porsche's business model.
Click into the configurator, and you can customize your car to your liking. Exterior colors, leather upholstery, exterior components—almost everything you see in the car can be tailored, down to the color‑coded instrument dials and the Porsche crest embossed on the armrests. Customization itself is nothing new; every automaker offers it. What sets Porsche apart is the dizzying array of choices—for instance, the "Paint to Sample" program (featuring 58 classic Porsche colors) alone offers dozens of options.
Prospective owners click and select, crafting their own unique vehicle as if playing a simulation game. This high level of engagement, and the resulting one‑of‑a‑kind car, is the unique emotional value Porsche provides to its customers. On social media, Porsche owners frequently share their configuration sheets and discuss their selection strategies.
But this emotional value comes at a steep price. If you choose a "Paint to Sample" color, you'll pay over 100,000 RMB extra. Add other options, and a car listed at 1 million yuan can easily soar to 1.4 million—enough to buy a premium six‑seat SUV elsewhere. This model not only delivers an exclusive brand experience and identity value for luxury buyers but also gives Porsche exceptionally high per‑vehicle revenue and margins—one of the key differentiators from other automakers. In a sense, speccing out a Porsche is itself part of the joy of owning one.
But now, that logic has broken down. High‑end consumption has cooled, Porsche has faced setbacks in the Chinese market, and domestic electric vehicle brands have been cascading features once reserved for luxury cars down to more affordable models—creating a powerful challenge. Facing fierce competition in China, Porsche is changing its profit model.
Porsche has redrawn the boundaries of personalization, aiming to preserve the bespoke experience for owners while selling more cars. The Era Edition launched in March is a new experiment. According to Porsche sales staff, the Era Edition includes 13 previously optional features as standard, such as 20‑inch wheels, ventilated and heated seats, and a panoramic sunroof. Under the old approach, adding these would have cost an extra 100,000 yuan or more. Now, they are all bundled into the 998,000‑yuan starting price.
Of course, this change is still modest. A typical Panamera configurator offers over 200 selectable items; the Era Edition's options have been trimmed by only about 5‑10%. Porsche has kept the key SKUs that enable personalization—special paints, SportDesign packages, air suspension, rear‑axle steering, and so on—which remain the backbone of the "configurator culture."
Lowering the purchase barrier, streamlining SKUs, and not relying entirely on options for profit—Porsche's adjustments in China echo the broader transformation at Volkswagen Group. Recently, facing tough market conditions, Volkswagen announced it would cut its model lineup by up to 50%, phase out niche models, and drastically simplify vehicle configuration schemes, reducing option complexity by as much as 75% to eliminate excess parts and R&D waste.
Now, the 718 Boxster, 718 Cayman, and the first‑generation Macan (ICE) have been officially discontinued. The newly launched Era Edition represents pricing and option adjustments—Porsche is fighting to save itself.
Cheng Ye loves the Panamera's sporty exterior and luxurious interior. When he's actually driving it, whether it's the opulent ambiance created by the detailed features or the launch‑control function, he feels the Panamera is unlike any other car. When he bought his car, he added nine individual options, including rear‑axle steering, Exclusive Design taillights, and high‑gloss black paint. The most expensive was the Barrique‑Red genuine leather interior at 86,300 RMB; his total option bill came to 241,000 RMB. "That's a fairly long list," says Cheng. "I just chose what I liked."
Seeing the new Era Edition, Cheng views it as a more subtle price cut—essentially a disguised discount that, like a direct price reduction, will affect brand value to some extent. But ownership is also a process of demystification. He often tells friends: "When you don't have it, it's a Panamera; once you have it, it's just a car." For Cheng, the Panamera was once a youthful dream. Once that dream came true, "it naturally becomes just a car again."
3. Used Car Prices Can't Hold Up
"Since the Era Edition launched, the number of inquiries and buyers has clearly increased," says a Porsche salesperson, who highly recommends the model. When showing customers around, sales reps invariably pull out the spec sheet to highlight that the Era Edition not only has a lower starting price but also includes many features as standard.
The new strategy is working—but with significant side effects. Less than six months after taking delivery, Zhou Ming sold his Panamera. After actually driving it, Zhou found it a bit sluggish for a sports sedan. "It's not just me—even the dealer thought so." The low‑speed hesitation was his biggest complaint. "Torque, horsepower, and power are all modest," he says, describing the ride as "smooth as an EV," and he felt the car was too conservative. "Power isn't very strong, and the noise insulation and seat comfort are just average."
"I wanted to sell it three times in under six months." Actually, after just three months, he already wanted to sell it, but he hesitated because he had been so excited when he bought it. When he learned this year that the new Panamera's entry price had dropped below one million, he made up his mind: "If I don't sell now, I'll lose even more later—better to sell early."
When it came time to actually sell, he found the used‑car market had changed dramatically. "When I first thought about selling, I could get 900,000 RMB; two months later, it dropped to 850,000. That's about 50,000 yuan of depreciation every two months." In the end, Zhou sold his Panamera for 850,000 RMB.
In truth, it's not just Porsche's residual values that are under pressure—the entire pricing system for used combustion‑engine cars is collapsing. Data from the China Automobile Dealers Association shows that the used‑car manager index for June this year stood at 43.5%, in a contraction zone—a butterfly effect from the new‑car market's sustained price‑for‑volume strategy, with traditional fuel‑powered luxury brands suffering the sharpest declines in value retention. According to Shandong Peninsula News, used luxury fuel cars have seen massive price drops; in one Qingdao listing, an 8‑year‑old Bentley Flying Spur was offered at just 268,000 RMB, a Volkswagen Touareg that cost nearly 900,000 new sold used for 68,000 RMB, and many Mercedes‑Benz and Land Rover models also plunged.
On used‑car platforms, Panameras up to three years old generally sit in the 700,000‑900,000 RMB range; a 10‑year‑old one now costs only 318,000 RMB, and the cheapest—a 2013 Panamera 4—goes for just 99,800 RMB.
"It can't be helped. With EVs shaking up the market, most cars don't hold their value," Zhou sighs. For fuel‑car owners, volatile gasoline prices this year have also been a shock. "The Panamera has a 90‑liter tank; filling up with 98‑octane costs nearly 1,000 RMB, while someone else's EV costs only 50 RMB for a full charge." Even for a million‑yuan luxury car owner, the 50‑vs‑1,000‑yuan gap is impossible to ignore.
4. Protect Sales Volume, or Protect Margins?
Porsche is surely aware of the impact that dropping the Panamera's entry price below one million will have on the used‑car market, but it's a path the company has no choice but to take.
The Panamera is Porsche's only four‑door large luxury coupe. It made its world debut in Shanghai in 2009 and officially entered the Chinese market. It became Porsche's fourth model line after the 911, Boxster/Cayman, and Cayenne, and marked Porsche's first foray into the large luxury executive sedan segment. At launch, the Panamera came with a V8 engine and was priced from 1.843 million to 2.49 million RMB. The steep price didn't deter wealthy buyers; instead, its precise positioning filled a gap in the "four‑door GT coupe" market. The first generation sold over 150,000 units globally, with China accounting for about 28% of that.
At the time, the D‑segment luxury sedan market was dominated by the Mercedes‑Benz S‑Class, BMW 7 Series, and Audi A8—all traditional executive sedans with a classic, conservative style. The Panamera, by contrast, carried Porsche's sports‑car DNA, with its fastback roofline and iconic frog‑face front, making it instantly recognizable. Visually, it captured the attention of newly wealthy post‑70s entrepreneurs and younger founders. In terms of driving and practicality, the Panamera offered sports‑car‑level acceleration and handling while retaining four doors and four seats—suitable for self‑driving or business use, blending "sports‑car passion with luxury sedan practicality"—with almost no direct rival in its class. In the hearts of luxury car owners, the Panamera became synonymous with young money and first‑generation entrepreneurs. Back then, getting one even required waiting in line and paying a premium.
In the past two years, however, the luxury car market has cooled. Domestic high‑end EVs such as the Zun Jie S800 and NIO ET9 have also posed a certain challenge, and Panamera sales are far below their peak. Last year, Porsche sold only 12,000 Panameras in China—a near‑40% decline over three years. The slowdown isn't limited to the Panamera; Porsche's overall profits and sales are also declining. In 2025, Porsche's operating profit plunged 90%, with a sales return of just 1.1%; China sales fell 26%, the fourth consecutive annual decline. In the first half of this year, Porsche's China sales dropped another 32% year‑on‑year—the downturn continues.
To save itself, Porsche has taken a series of drastic measures beyond launching a sub‑million Panamera. In early January, it appointed a new CEO and plans to cut 9,000 jobs globally. To focus on core business, Porsche sold its stake in Bugatti in April this year. Its dealer network is also shrinking: by the end of 2026, Porsche's sales outlets in China will be reduced from a peak of 150 to roughly 80.
When Qiu Man first walked into a Porsche 4S store, she found only two cars on display. The salesperson told her the store would soon close and directed her to another location for a test drive. "Now there are only two Porsche 4S stores left in all of Shenzhen." Still, fewer stores and softer prices haven't dented her perception of the brand. She compares Porsche to property in Shenzhen: "Even if prices in prime locations drop by a few tens of thousands, those who couldn't afford it still can't—a Ferrari is still a Ferrari when it's old."
A luxury car can bring tangible, additional benefits in business. For entrepreneur Qiu Man, the Panamera is like a silent business card. Whether meeting clients or visiting factories, the car sends a message: this person is reliable and capable.
"Price cuts aren't necessarily bad—Porsche needs to face reality." From a business perspective, Qiu offers another interpretation. In her view, pricing and brand image are like two sides of a scale; there must be a balance. Too much of a discount collapses the luxury aura, while staying too proud hurts sales. She thinks the Panamera's current pricing strategy is just right: through this disguised price cut, it avoids the luxury tax while remaining a dream car for young people. But she hopes the price won't drop further. "Maintaining your stature is crucial—once you bow your head, you can never lift it again." Qiu suspects Porsche won't plunge headlong into a price war.
The question facing Porsche is stark: protect sales volume, or protect profits? Porsche's new CEO, Michael Leiters, already has an answer. Going forward, Porsche will focus on improving the profitability of existing and future models: "Even if we sell fewer cars, we must make money."