These past few days, a migration crisis unfolding on the African continent has rapidly opened deep rifts within the European Union.
The first to formally reinstate border checks was Italy. Although it shares no land border with Spain, Italy’s Interior Ministry suddenly announced that, from August 1, for a period of one month, selective checks would be imposed on non-EU travellers arriving from Spain by air or sea. This means that third-country nationals—such as Chinese tourists—even if they already hold a valid Schengen visa, may still have their passports and visas re-checked upon arrival in Italy. France quickly followed suit, strengthening patrols along its border with Spain, while President Macron stated that, if necessary, France would step up controls on its border with Spain.
One stone stirred up a thousand waves. Germany also planned to extend its existing land border checks, and Denmark’s Prime Minister even suggested that the EU should discuss suspending Spain’s Schengen membership. Overnight, European countries became tense. The trigger for all this lay across the Mediterranean, in the North African country of Morocco.
On July 30, large numbers of young Moroccans suddenly waded into the sea from the shore—some carrying swimming rings to bypass breakwaters, others rushing toward border fences—all heading for Ceuta, Spain’s North African enclave. In just two days, the Spanish government estimated that about 50,000 people entered Ceuta by land and sea; local authorities gave an even higher figure, possibly up to 60,000. At least 67 people died in the chaos—some drowned, others were crushed while climbing over breakwaters and fences.
Spain then deployed its military, and Morocco also re‑tightened border controls. By the evening of July 31, about 48,300 people had returned to Morocco. However, this does not mean Spain completed the repatriation of over 40,000 people in a single day. Many Moroccans, after coming ashore, discovered that Ceuta did not have enough food or shelter, and there was no rumoured passage directly to continental Europe—so they had no choice but to go back disappointed.
It is worth noting that the young Moroccans who surged toward Ceuta were, to some extent, lured by social media. Earlier, Spain’s Supreme Court had ruled that migrants who swim to Spain’s North African territories of Ceuta or Melilla could not be immediately sent back upon arrival; they must go through normal identity registration and case‑by‑case review procedures. But on Instagram, TikTok, and smugglers’ chat groups, the rumour spread that as long as you swam into Ceuta, Spain could not send you back. In fact, that policy only applied to those who had already been living in Spain before January 1 this year and met conditions such as continuous residence, and the application window had long closed. Those who swam into Ceuta only at the end of July obviously missed that bus.
Even more awkwardly, although Ceuta belongs to Spain and is part of EU territory, there is no free passage that allows anyone to casually enter continental Europe. Whether taking a boat or a plane from Ceuta to mainland Spain, documents must be checked again. People without legal status cannot pass the document checks when leaving Ceuta, let alone walk all the way from Spain to France and Italy. But EU countries had already rushed to shut their doors first. When the news reached China, Xiaohongshu users also began to panic—some who had recently obtained Spanish visas and planned to go to Italy worried that they would be stopped upon arrival.
Thus, an EU border crisis ended up affecting Chinese outbound tourists.
Behind this EU border crisis lies the recent friction between Spain and Morocco. In previous years, Spain and the EU continuously provided Morocco with funds, equipment, and cooperative projects, mainly in exchange for Morocco guarding the first gateway to Europe. When Morocco patrolled seriously, the western Mediterranean remained relatively calm; but if border police relaxed a little, Ceuta could be flooded with migrants within hours.
A similar scene had already occurred in 2021. At that time, Spain received the leader of the Western Sahara independence movement, Brahim Ghali, for medical treatment, angering Morocco. Morocco then suddenly loosened border management, and about 10,000 people poured into Ceuta, including many minors. This time, Morocco denies deliberately letting people through, and the Spanish government also stresses that bilateral relations are normal—yet suspicious points remain numerous. Spain’s left‑wing Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez had just visited Algeria, which has long supported Western Sahara independence, and Spain’s parliament recently passed a bill to grant nationality to some descendants of Western Saharans. In reality, it is hard to believe that 50,000 to 60,000 people converging on the border from various places could have gone completely unnoticed. Whether Morocco truly failed to stop them or was not very willing to stop them, no one can say for certain.
What is truly interesting is that the migrants in Ceuta had not even left North Africa, yet European countries thousands of kilometres away—already traumatised by North African migrants—could not sit still. Take Italy’s Meloni government, for example: the more immediate pressure comes from domestic politics. She came to power on a tough immigration platform, and now faces competition from the new far‑right party led by former General Vannacci. As soon as the Ceuta gate opened, if she did not immediately prove her stance, she risked being drowned in voter criticism. Most other European governments, also influenced by domestic anti‑immigration sentiment, had no choice but to take hardline positions. In short, whether migrants leave Ceuta or not does not matter; European politicians must show their toughness by threatening to close borders.
Amusingly, Trump, thousands of miles away, did not miss this opportunity either. He called the scene in Ceuta an “invasion” and warned American voters that if Republicans lost the midterm elections, the same scene would appear in the United States. The U.S. State Department, meanwhile, directly blamed Spain’s Sánchez government and offered to help European allies preparing to take similar measures—it is hard not to see this as retaliation for Spain’s neutral stance in the U.S.-Iran conflict. Previously, Spain refused to raise defence spending to 5% of GDP and would not allow the U.S. to use its bases at Rota and Morón for military operations against Iran; the Sánchez government also publicly opposed U.S. and Israeli military action against Iran. At this moment, Ceuta served as a convenient example to prove the Sánchez government’s incompetence and to put more pressure on Madrid.
But the most embarrassed of all is the EU. On June 12, the new Pact on Migration and Asylum was formally implemented, with EU members having just pledged to unify external border checks, speed up repatriations, and share burdens among member states. Yet less than two months later, when Spain really ran into trouble, the first reaction of each country was to look after its own interests. People often joke that the EU specialises in drafting strange and absurd regulations—American innovation, Chinese manufacturing, European legislation. This time, the ink was barely dry on the new law, and EU members immediately proved in practice that they themselves do not even fully trust the rules they just wrote. Even if the gap in Ceuta has been re‑sealed, the cracks among Schengen countries will not be so easily mended.
After the Ceuta crisis, many began to worry whether the Schengen visa is nearing its end. In the short term, that is unlikely. In fact, the Schengen system does two things: the most important is sharing common short‑stay visa rules externally—so Chinese tourists who get a Spanish visa can still travel to France, Italy, and other Schengen countries. The other is that, in principle, internal border checks among member states are abolished, allowing travellers to board cross‑border flights and trains without even realising they have changed countries. For now, the basic rules of the Schengen visa remain, but what governments are exploiting is mainly the latter.
In fact, EU rules do allow member states to temporarily reinstate internal border checks when public security faces a serious threat—but this is supposed to be a last resort, with limited duration and scope. The problem is that these temporary measures in Europe have become increasingly prolonged. Even before the Ceuta incident, Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, and others had already restored various forms of internal checks—some on roads, with occasional spot checks at railways and ports. When the time limit expires, they simply extend it with a new justification. Border checks do not block every tourist every day, but they gradually erode the smoothness of Schengen travel.
If, in the future, the 29 Schengen countries were to require tourists to obtain 29 separate visas—that dramatic scenario would be not only a traveller’s nightmare but also a noose around the EU’s neck. The unified visa is far too important for EU tourism revenue, aviation networks, and business exchanges for anyone to dismantle lightly. As with Denmark’s proposal to suspend Spain’s Schengen membership—it sounds serious, but it is not that easy to implement. A single member state cannot simply expel Spain on its own. Under current rules, if the EU assesses that a country has persistent serious problems in managing its external borders, the European Council may recommend that other countries temporarily reinstate internal checks for a limited time—but there is no simple procedure to immediately invalidate Schengen visas issued by Spain.
So, for Chinese tourists who have already obtained Spanish visas, there is currently no need to rush to cancel flights or apply for an additional Italian visa. What they really need to pay more attention to is not to cut cross‑border travel too tight; it is best to have electronic or paper copies of hotel bookings and return flight tickets ready, and to be able to clearly state where they came from and where they are going when asked. A more likely outcome in the future is that EU countries will continue to hold their noses and sell the same Schengen visa, but quietly add extra checks at airports, ports, and highways.
In other words, a Schengen visa may still allow you to travel across Europe—but in practice, you should be mentally prepared to have your documents checked more often. For Europe’s tourism industry, even the lightest increase in spot checks has a considerable impact. Chinese tourists who fly over ten hours to Europe rarely visit just one city. In traditional classic itineraries—whether it is an 11‑day Spain‑Portugal tour or a 10‑day France‑Italy‑Switzerland tour—it is the combination of several countries that makes a long‑haul trip worthwhile. As border checks multiply, coach tours must recalculate border‑crossing times, cross‑border trains and ferries are more prone to delays, and shore excursions from Mediterranean cruises become tighter. What truly headaches tour operators is that no one knows whether a half‑hour check might suddenly drag on to two hours. Multi‑country itineraries that used to fit together seamlessly now require planners to re‑evaluate, and with the same holiday time, tourists may be able to visit fewer places.
In short, the experience of travelling across Europe with just one visa, almost imperceptibly, has already begun to be discounted. The young Moroccans who swam into Ceuta were merely the spark—the real trouble for the Schengen visa is the habitual buck‑passing among European countries whenever a crisis strikes.